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11. Introduction
A well-known puzzle in the growth literature is the insigniﬁcant or negative correla-
tion between aggregate R&D intensity and the per-capita GDP growth rate found by
several empirical studies (e.g., Bassanini, Scarpetta, and Visco, 2000); a related puzzle
occurs with respect to the relation between R&D intensity and ﬁrm size (e.g., Pagano and
Schivardi, 2003). The literature often underlines the complexity of the link between these
variables (e.g., Audretsch and Keilbacha, 2008), and the several conceptual and measure-
ment problems that aﬄict empirical analysis in this ﬁeld (e.g., Bartelsman, Haltiwanger,
and Scarpetta, 2005) to explain the lack of robust results. This paper highlights the
role of inter-R&D composition eﬀects in accounting for the above facts, by developing a
model of simultaneous horizontal and vertical R&D by entrants within a lab-equipment
speciﬁcation. In the existing models, featuring a knowledge-driven speciﬁcation (e.g.,
Peretto, 1998; Howitt, 1999; Peretto and Smulders, 2002; Peretto and Connolly, 2007),
re-compositions between vertical and horizontal R&D are not able to produce a nega-
tive correlation between total R&D intensity and economic growth, as the latter only
changes in response to vertical innovation. Our results hence show the compatibility be-
tween innovation as the ultimate source of economic growth and the empirical evidence
concerning the link between aggregate R&D intensity and both ﬁrm size and economic
growth.
The joint consideration of horizontal and vertical R&D in a framework that allows
for the study of their dynamic interaction ﬁts the vision that growth proceeds along
an extensive (introduction of new goods) and an intensive margin (increase of good
quality and reduction of marginal costs). This is in accord with the description of the
process of industrial growth in both economic history and industry life-cycle literature
(e.g., Freeman and Soete, 1997; Klepper, 1996). Furthermore, this approach allows us
to consider economic growth and ﬁrm dynamics, measured by size and/or the number of
ﬁrms, under the same framework.
This paper follows the “creative destruction”, or tournament, tradition in the simul-
taneous treatment of horizontal and vertical R&D: the entrant must choose between
vertical and horizontal R&D, whereas the incumbent does not perform any R&D (e.g.,
Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Howitt, 1999; Segerstrom, 2000). Thus, we depart from the
non-tournament approach, which postulates that vertical R&D is done by the incumbent
and horizontal R&D is carried out by entrants (e.g., Young, 1998; Peretto, 1998, 1999;
Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1998; Peretto and Smulders, 2002). Indeed, according to the
stylised facts on entry (e.g., Geroski, 1995; Klepper, 1996), it (i) occurs mostly in already
existing sectors, (ii) is driven mostly by new ﬁrms (instead of incumbents enduring di-
versiﬁcation processes), and (iii) is closely related to R&D activities. In a model of R&D
and ﬁrm dynamics under monopolistic competition, like ours, where R&D activity is the
only mechanism by which entrants can make a competitive entry (by introducing either
a new variety or a higher-quality version of an existing good), those facts imply that not
only horizontal but also vertical R&D must be performed by entrants.1
1Vertical R&D by entrants is neither logically nor empirically incompatible with vertical R&D by
2The entry mechanism is a key component of the model. A potential entrant has
to choose between introducing an innovation in an existing industry, specialised in the
production of a particular variety, or introducing a new variety. In contrast to Howitt
(1999), among others, we assume that there are no intersectoral spillovers in vertical R&D
(e.g., Segerstrom, 2007; Etro, 2008). The entrant then faces a double uncertainty at each
point in time: he/she does not know if a successful innovation will occur and in which
industry it will take place. In particular, with respect to horizontal entry, the potential
entrant has to compare the costs of creating a new variety with the expected beneﬁts
from introducing an innovation in any of the existing industries. We assume that the
arrival of the innovation in any industry follows the Schumpeterian creative-destruction
process with Poisson distribution, while its occurrence in a particular industry follows a
uniform distribution.
Also crucial is the way R&D technology is characterised in the model. We consider a
lab-equipment speciﬁcation, whereas the literature predominantly assumes that R&D is
knowledge-driven.2 In the latter case, the choice between vertical and horizontal R&D
implies a division of labour between the two types of R&D. Since the total labour level is
determined exogenously, there is a shortcoming: in the end, the rate of extensive growth
is exogenous, i.e., the balanced-growth-path (BGP) ﬂow of new goods occurs at the
same rate as (or proportional to) population growth. The alternative assumption that
R&D is of the lab-equipment type implies that the choice between vertical and horizontal
innovation is related to the splitting of R&D expenditures, which are fully endogenous.
Therefore, we endogenise the overall growth rate and thus the rate of extensive growth.
In particular, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model where, from the point
of view of households, wealth can be accumulated either by creating new ﬁrms or by ac-
cumulating capital (e.g., Brito and Dixon, 2009). A quality-ladders mechanism provides
the non-physical capital accumulation (technological knowledge), whilst an expanding-
variety mechanism oﬀers the ﬂow of new ﬁrms (new good lines). Average ﬁrm size is thus
measured as technological-knowledge stock per ﬁrm, which, however, relates closely to
production (sales) or ﬁnancial assets per ﬁrm.
This creates a channel between vertical R&D (hence aggregate growth) and ﬁrm dy-
namics, both in the long run (BGP) and in the medium run (transition), due to the nature
of horizontal entry technology. We consider simultaneously dynamic and static decreas-
ing returns to horizontal R&D: the former capture the negative spillovers associated with
the number of varieties (e.g., due to the existence of proportional barriers to entry) and
the latter implies new varieties are brought to the market gradually, instead of through
a lumpy adjustment. This is in line with the stylised facts on entry (e.g., Geroski, 1995),
incumbents, as attested by the extant papers on vertical R&D simultaneously by entrants and in-
cumbent (e.g., Etro, 2004; Segerstrom, 2007). To simplify the structure of our model, we consider
R&D by only one type of ﬁrm; in the light of the aforementioned empirical facts, we let that type
be the entrants. A very recent paper with vertical R&D only by entrants is Francois and Lloyd-Ellis
(2009).
2Using Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991)’s terminology, the assumption that homogeneous ﬁnal good is
the R&D input means that one adopts the “lab-equipment” version of R&D, instead of the “knowledge-
driven” speciﬁcation, in which labour is ultimately the only input.
3according to which entry occurs mostly at small scale (adjustment costs penalise large-
scale initial entry). So far, the literature has treated the two features separately (the
former in, e.g., Evans, Honkapohja, and Romer, 1998; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004;
the latter in, e.g., Howitt, 1999; Jones and Williams, 2000). The ﬁrst feature is crucial
for the BGP properties of the model. The negative spillovers in horizontal entry per se
determine a constant number of varieties/ﬁrms along the BGP; however, vertical R&D
sustains variety expansion and aggregate growth at a positive ﬁnite rate. The second
feature is key with respect to transitional dynamics. We show static decreasing returns
to horizontal R&D introduce dynamic second-order eﬀects in entry: the entry cost in-
creases with the number of ﬁrms entering the market at a given instant.This friction in
horizontal entry generates transitional dynamics, which operates through adjustments in
average ﬁrm size. We also show that, given the interrelation between the two types of
R&D, the dynamics is explicitly obtained from a piecewise-smooth dynamical system.
In the end, our framework gives rise to strong endogenous inter-R&D composition
eﬀects and makes economic growth and ﬁrm dynamics closely related: vertical R&D
is the ultimate growth engine, whilst horizontal R&D builds an explicit link between
aggregate and ﬁrm-dynamics variables.3
One of the most interesting ﬁndings of the paper is the mixed result with respect to the
BGP relation between R&D intensity and both economic growth and ﬁrm size, thereby
lending theoretical support to the previously highlighted lack of clear-cut empirical rela-
tionship between those variables. Shifts in the BGP due to changes in preferences or in
vertical-entry costs give rise to a positive correlation between R&D intensity and both
growth and ﬁrm size, whilst changes in horizontal-entry costs yield a negative relation-
ship. This is explained by an endogenous inter-R&D composition eﬀect: an increase
in horizontal-entry costs induces a shift of resources from horizontal to vertical R&D,
but the eﬀect on the growth rate of the increment in the vertical type is dominated by
the decrease in the horizontal one. That is, there is a negative correlation between the
growth rate and vertical R&D whose eﬀect outweights the positive correlation between
the former and horizontal R&D.
Furthermore, in transitional dynamics the relationship between R&D intensity and
both economic growth and ﬁrm size is unequivocally negative. Consider an emergent-
market economy displaying a shallow market of diﬀerentiated goods, i.e., with a number of
varieties too low relative to the technological-knowledge stock, hence ﬁrm size that is too
large. Such an economy starts with a smaller vertical-innovation rate and higher economic
growth than a mature (deep-) market economy. A lower vertical-innovation rate implies
a higher real interest rate and lower vertical R&D, which secure the larger resources
allocated to horizontal R&D. Along the transition path, the growth rate decreases, while
the resources allocated to horizontal R&D are gradually re-targeted to vertical R&D, thus
3This point has been made recently by Peretto and Connolly (2007), in a diﬀerent analytical setup. Like
Peretto (1998, 1999) and others, the authors build an endogenous growth model where incumbents
do deterministic cost-reducing R&D, while entrants bring new products to the market, under a
knowledge-driven speciﬁcation. They consider ﬁxed operating costs, which, unless the exogenous
population growth rate is positive, determine a constant number of varieties along the BGP. Under
this setting, only vertical R&D allows for growth “unconstrained by endowments”.
4increasing the vertical-innovation rate. Thus, the latter and both the growth rate and
ﬁrm size are negatively related. Due to a composition eﬀect identical to that described
for the BGP, R&D intensity moves in tandem with the vertical-innovation rate.4
Our model is close to Evans, Honkapohja, and Romer (1998), who build an expanding-
variety mechanism with a lab-equipment speciﬁcation exhibiting dynamic decreasing re-
turns to scale. Here, variety expansion is ultimately sustained by physical-capital accumu-
lation. Like us, Arnold (1998) and Funke and Strulik (2000) obtain an expanding-variety
mechanism that is driven by non-physical capital accumulation, in their case in the form
of human capital. However, there is no inter-R&D composition eﬀect in these models,
as they only feature horizontal R&D. In contrast, several recent models consider both
horizontal and vertical innovation, focusing on the study of economic growth and ﬁrm dy-
namics under a common framework (e.g., van de Klundert and Smulders, 1997; Peretto,
1998, 1999, 2007; Thompson, 2001; Peretto and Smulders, 2002). As already stated, in
as much as these models feature a knowledge-driven speciﬁcation, shifts between vertical
and horizontal R&D are unable to produce a negative correlation between total R&D
intensity and growth, as the latter only changes in response to the intensive margin. The
noteworthy exception is Peretto (2007), where R&D has a lab-equipment speciﬁcation.
However, this is a non-tournament model with deterministic vertical R&D.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the
model, giving a detailed account of the production, price and R&D decisions, and derive
the dynamic general equilibrium. In Sections 3 and 4, we analyse the interior BGP and
local-dynamics properties, and discuss their consistency with the empirical literature.
Section 5 presents some concluding remarks.
2. The model
We build a dynamic general equilibrium model of a closed economy where a single
competitively-produced ﬁnal good can be used in consumption, production of intermedi-
ate goods and R&D. The ﬁnal good is produced by a (large) number of ﬁrms, each using
labour and a continuum of intermediate goods indexed by ! 2 [0;N]. The economy is
populated by L identical dynastic families, each endowed with one unit of labour that
is inelastically supplied to ﬁnal-good ﬁrms. Thus, the total labour level is L, which, by
assumption, is constant over time. In turn, families make consumption decisions and
invest in ﬁrms’ equity.
Potential entrants can devote resources either to horizontal or to vertical R&D. Hori-
zontal R&D increases the number of intermediate-goodindustries N, while vertical R&D
increases the quality of the good of an existing industry, indexed by j(!). Quality level
j(!) translates into productivity of the ﬁnal producer from using the good produced by
industry !, j(!), where  > 1 is a parameter measuring the size of each quality upgrade.
By improving on the current best quality index j, a successful R&D ﬁrm will introduce
the leading-edge quality j(!)+1 and hence render ineﬃcient the existing input supplied
4The negative relationship between economic growth and the vertical-innovation rate is also apparent
in Aghion and Howitt (1998), but only for a speciﬁc set of parameter values.
5by the producer of !. Therefore, the successful innovator will become a monopolist in !.
However, this monopoly, and the monopolist earnings that come with it, are temporary,
because a new successful innovator will eventually substitute the incumbent.
2.1. Production and price decisions
The ﬁnal-good ﬁrm has a constant-returns-to-scale technology using labour and a contin-
uum of intermediate goods with measure N(t), changing over time t, which is well-known
from Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, ch. 6 and ch. 7)






d!; 0 <  < 1;  > 1; (1)
where A > 0 is the total factor productivity, L is the labour input and 1  is the labour
share in production,and j(!;t)  X(!;t) is the input of intermediate good ! measured
in eﬃciency units at time t.5That is, we integrate the ﬁnal-producer technology that
is considered in variety-expansion (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, ch. 6) and quality-
ladders (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, ch. 7) models.
Final producers are price-takers in all the markets they participate. They take wages,
w(t), and input prices p(!;t) as given and sell their output at a price equal to unity. From
the proﬁt maximisation conditions, we determine the aggregate demand of intermediate
good ! as
X (!;t) = L 
 




; ! 2 [0;N(t)]: (2)
The intermediate-good sector consists of a continuum N(t) of industries. There is
monopolistic competition if we consider the whole sector: the monopolist in industry
! ﬁxes the price p(!;t) but faces the isoelastic demand curve (2). We assume that
the intermediate good is non-durable and entails a unit marginal cost of production,
in terms of the ﬁnal good, whose price is taken as given. Proﬁt in industry ! is thus
(!;t) = (p(!;t)   1)  X(!;t), and the proﬁt maximising price is a constant markup
over marginal cost6








Then, from (2) and (3), the aggregate quantity produced of ! is
5In equilibrium, only the top quality of each ! is produced and used; thus, X(j;!;t) = X(!;t).
Henceforth, we only use all arguments (j;!;t) if they are useful for expositional convenience.
6We assume that
1
 < ; i.e., if
1
 is the price of the top quality, the price of the next lowest grade,
1
, is less than the unit marginal cost. In this case, lower grades are unable to provide any eﬀective
competition, and the top-quality producer can charge the unconstrained monopoly price.
6X(!;t) = L 
 
A  2 1
1  q(!;t), (5)
and the proﬁt accrued by the monopolist in ! is
(!;t) = 0  L  q(!;t); (6)









seen as the “basic” proﬁt ﬂow.7













1   L  Q(t); (8)












(!;t)d! = 0  L  Q(t); (10)
are all linear functions of Q(t).
2.2. R&D
We assume there is both vertical and horizontal R&D (e.g., Howitt, 1999; Segerstrom,
2000), that R&D is only performed by (potential) entrants, and that successful R&D
leads to the set up of a new ﬁrm in either an existing or in a new industry. There is
perfect competition among entrants and free entry in R&D business. As already stated,
these assumptions are consistent with a number of stylised facts on entry (e.g., Geroski,
1995; Klepper, 1996).
The mechanism of entry is a key aspect of our model. A potential entrant has to
choose between introducing an innovation in an existing industry, which is specialised in
the production of a particular existing variety, or introducing a new variety. Diﬀerently
from Howitt (1999) and others, we assume that there are no intersectoral spillovers in
vertical R&D (e.g., Segerstrom, 2007; Etro, 2008). The entrant then faces a double
uncertainty at each point in time: he/she does not know if a successful innovation will
occur and in which industry it will take place. First, the arrival of an innovation in
any extant industry follows the Schumpeterian creative-destruction process with Poisson
7This is the proﬁt ﬂow, constant over time, that accrues when j = 0 (i.e., q = 1).
7distribution. This process may lead to entry, but it will also erode the monopoly power
stemming from the innovation, regardless of which type, vertical or horizontal. Then,
the dilemma for the potential entrant lies in introducing an innovation that will increase
quality in an uncertain but existing industry or creating a new variety. In order to
compare the beneﬁts from the two types of entry, we assume that the quality level for
the new industry will be the mean quality of the existing industries, while vertical entry
will bring about an increase in quality by =(1 ) for an existing but uncertain industry.
2.2.1. Vertical R&D free-entry and dynamic arbitrage conditions
As is common in the literature, each new design is granted a patent and thus a successful
innovator retains exclusive rights over the use of his/her good. By improving on the
current top quality level j(!;t), a successful R&D ﬁrm earns monopoly proﬁts from
selling the leading-edge input of j(!;t) + 1 quality to ﬁnal-good ﬁrms. A successful
innovation will instantaneously increase the quality index in ! from q(!;t) = q(j) to
q+(!;t) = q(j + 1) = =(1 )q(!;t). In equilibrium, lower qualities of ! are priced out
of business.
Let Ii (j) denote the Poisson arrival rate of vertical innovations (vertical-innovation
rate) by potential entrant i in industry ! when the highest quality is j. Rate Ii (j) is
independently distributed across ﬁrms, across industries and over time, and depends
on the ﬂow of resources Rvi (j) committed by entrants at time t. As in, e.g., Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (2004, ch. 7), Ii (j) features constant returns in R&D expenditures,
Ii (j) = Rvi (j)  (j), where (j) is the R&D productivity factor, which is assumed to
be homogeneous across i in !. We assume
(j) =
1
  L  q(j + 1)
; (11)
where  > 0 is a constant (ﬂow) ﬁxed vertical-R&D cost. Equation (11) incorporates
a congestion eﬀect (e.g., Segerstrom, 2007; Etro, 2008), implying vertical-R&D dynamic
decreasing returns to scale (i.e., decreasing returns to cumulated R&D).8To avoid the
usual scale eﬀect arising from labour level, (11) implies that an increase in market scale
dilutes the eﬀect of R&D outlays on innovation probability. Aggregating across i in !,
we get Rv (j) =
P
i Rvi (j) and I (j) =
P
i Ii (j), and thus
I (j) = Rv (j) 
1
  L  q(j + 1)
: (12)
Observe that here I(!;t) = I(j) is time-varying, and not constant as is usual in the
literature.
As the terminal date of each monopoly arrives as a Poisson process with frequency
I (j) per (inﬁnitesimal) increment of time, the present value of a monopolist’s proﬁts is a
8The way  depends on j implies that the increasing diﬃculty of creating new qualities exactly oﬀsets
the increased rewards from marketing higher qualities - see (11) and (6). This allows for constant
vertical-innovation rate over t and across ! along the BGP, i.e., a symmetric equilibrium (on asym-
metric equilibria in quality-ladders models and its growth consequences, see Cozzi, 2007).
8random variable. Let V (j) denote the expected value of an incumbent ﬁrm with current
quality level j(!;t),9






where r is the equilibrium market real interest rate and  (j), given by (6), is constant
in-between innovations. Free-entry prevails in vertical R&D such that the condition
I(j)  V (j + 1) = Rv (j) holds, which implies that
V (j + 1) =
1
(j)
=   L  q(j + 1): (14)
Next, we determine V (j+1) analogously to (13), then consider (14) and time-diﬀerentiate
the resulting expression. Thus, if we also consider (6), we get the arbitrage condition
facing a vertical innovator
 =
0
r(t) + I (t)
: (15)
It has several implications:10ﬁrstly, the present value of “basic” proﬁts, using the eﬀective
rate of interest r + I as a discount factor, should be equal to the ﬁxed cost of entry;
secondly, the rates of entry are symmetric across industries I(!;t) = I(t); and, ﬁnally,
the eﬀective discount rate is constant over time. Then, the vertical-innovation rate is
perfectly negatively correlated to the rate of return I(t) = 0=   r(t).
Solving equation (12) for Rv(!;t) = Rv(j) and aggregating across industries !, we
determine total resources devoted to vertical R&D, Rv(t), Rv (t) =
R N(t)
0 Rv (!;t)d! =
R N(t)
0   L  q+(!;t)  I (!;t)d!. As the innovation rate is industry independent, then
Rv (t) =   L  

1   I(t)  Q(t): (16)
2.2.2. Horizontal R&D free-entry and dynamic arbitrage conditions
Variety expansion arises from R&D aimed at creating a new intermediate good. Again,
innovation is performed by a potential entrant, which means that, because there is free
entry, the new good is produced by new ﬁrms. Under perfect competition among R&D





Ne(t) is the contribution to the instantaneous ﬂow of the new
good by R&D ﬁrm e at a cost of  units of the ﬁnal good and Rne (t) is the ﬂow of
9We assume that entrants are risk-neutral and, thus, only care about the expected value.

























. Then, if we time-diﬀerentiate (14) considering (13) and the equations
above, we get r(t) =
(j+1)I(j)
Rv(j)   I(j + 1), which can then be re-written as (15).
9resources devoted to horizontal R&D by innovator e at time t. The cost  is assumed to









Rn (t) =  
:
N(t): (17)
We assume that the cost of setting up a new variety (cost of horizontal entry) is increasing
in both the number of existing varieties, N, and the number of new entrants, _ N,
(t) =   N(t)  _ N(t); (18)
where  > 0 is a ﬁxed (ﬂow) cost, and  > 0 and  > 0. The dependence of  on N
captures the assumption there are dynamic decreasing returns to scale. That is, the scale
of the economy induces a negative externality in the form of a barrier to entry because it
becomes costlier to introduce new varieties in large growing economies. The dependence
of  on _ N means that the entry technology displays static decreasing returns to scale
at the aggregate level, which we assume to be entirely external to the ﬁrm, but are
compatible with the previous assumption of constant returns to scale at the ﬁrm level.
The existing endogenous-growth literature deals with the two features separately: some
models only display dynamic negative externalities (e.g., Evans, Honkapohja, and Romer,
1998; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, ch. 6) while others only assume static decreasing
returns to scale (e.g., Arnold, 1998; Howitt, 1999; Jones and Williams, 2000).11
The dependence of the entry cost on the number of entrants introduces dynamic second-
order eﬀects in entry, implying that new varieties are brought to the market gradually,
instead of through a lumpy adjustment. This is in line with the stylised facts on entry
(e.g., Geroski, 1995): entry occurs mostly at small scale since adjustment costs penalise
large-scale entry.










which is tantamount to having a uniform distribution with probability 1=N(t). As his/her
monopoly power will be also terminated by the arrival of a successful vertical innovator
in the future, the beneﬁts from entry are given by





t [r()+I( q)]dds; (20)
where   = 0L q. The free-entry condition is now _ N  V ( q) = Rn, which simpliﬁes to
V ( q) = (t): (21)
11We also departure from Howitt (1999) (see also Segerstrom, 2000) in that he hypothesises decreasing
returns to scale to R&D at the ﬁrm level. Such an entry technology implies that (keeping our
notation) V =  =
dRn
d _ N >
Rn
_ N . In contrast, given our assumption of constant returns to scale, we




d _ N (see (21), below). Note that the price of entry, V , equals the marginal cost
of entry, , in both cases considered above; nevertheless, the assumption of constant returns eschews
positive proﬁts from entering, since V =
Rn
_ N .
10Substituting (20) into (21) and time-diﬀerentiating the resulting expression, yields the
arbitrage equation facing a horizontal innovator




2.2.3. Consistency arbitrage condition
Before deciding which type of R&D to perform, the potential entrant should evaluate the
best type of entry. At the margin, she/he should be indiﬀerent between the two types,
implying there is a consistency condition between them. If we equate the eﬀective rate









This condition is one of the key ingredients of the model. It equates the cost of the
horizontal, , to the average cost of vertical R&D,  qL. In response to a given exogenous
shock, a lower (higher) N enhances (reduces) relative average quality, 1=N, received by
a newly-created variety, in order to compensate for a higher (lower) relative entry cost.
The adjustment of the relative average quality 1=N guarantees that (23) has a ﬁnite and
determined solution with respect to N without requiring (static) decreasing returns to
horizontal R&D. This reﬂects our assumption of the absence of intersectoral spillovers
in vertical innovation. In contrast, models that feature intersectoral spillovers in vertical
innovation display a relative average quality which is independent of the number of
varieties and, thus, the assumption of static decreasing returns to horizontal R&D (given
the constant returns to vertical R&D) is necessary to ensure an interior equilibrium with
non-zero vertical and horizontal innovative activity (e.g., Howitt, 1999).
Equation (23) can be equivalently recast as

















which clariﬁes the mechanism of entry adopted in our model by explicitly incorporating
a channel between vertical innovation and ﬁrm dynamics. It shows that the horizontal-
entry rate,
_ N
N, depends positively on Q and negatively on N: the ﬁrst eﬀect is an impli-
cation of the complementarity between the horizontal-entry rate and the technological-
knowledge stock, and the second results from the barriers-to-entry eﬀect incorporated in
equation (18).
In a small time interval, the rate of growth of average quality is equal to the ex-
pected arrival rate of a successful innovation multiplied by the quality shift it introduces:
11_ q=q = I(t)(q+   q)=q, where both the innovation rate and the quality shift are industry-
independent. Time-diﬀerentiating (19), and using (24) yields
_ Q(t) = (I(t)   + x(N(t);Q(t)))  Q(t): (26)







rate is endogenous and will be determined as an economy-wide function below. Equation
(26) introduces a second dynamic interaction between the two types of entry, in this
case between the number of varieties and the rate of growth of the quality index of the
economy.
2.3. Households
The economy has L identical dynastic families who consume and collect income (div-
idends) from investments in ﬁnancial assets (equity) and from labour. Each family is
endowed with one unit of labour that is inelastically supplied. Thus, total labour supply,
L, is exogenous and constant. We assume consumers have perfect foresight concerning
the technological change over time and every household chooses the path of consumption









where  > 0 is the subjective discount rate and  > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, subject to the ﬂow budget constraint
_ a(t) = r(t)  a(t) + w(t)   C(t); (28)
where a denotes household’s real ﬁnancial assets holdings. The initial level of wealth a(0)
is given and the non-Ponzi games condition limt!1e 
R t
0 r(s)dsa(t)  0 is also imposed.







 (r(t)   ) (29)
lim
t!1
e t  C(t)   a(t) = 0 (30)
2.4. Macroeconomic aggregation and equilibrium innovation rate
The aggregate ﬁnancial wealth held by all households is L  a(t) =
R N(t)
0 V (!;t)d!,
which, from the arbitrage condition between vertical and horizontal entry, yields La(t) =
(t)N(t). Taking time derivatives and comparing with (28), we get an expression for the
aggregate ﬂow budget constraint which is equivalent to the product market equilibrium
condition (see Appendix A)
Y (t) = L  C(t) + X(t) + Rv(t) + Rn(t): (31)
12If we substitute the expressions for the aggregate outputs (8) and (9) and for total R&D
expenditures (16) and (17), we have
L  HY  Q(t) = L  HX  Q(t) + L  C(t) + (t)  _ N(t) +   L  








1  and HX 
 
A  2 1
1 . Solving for I, and using (23) and








HY   HX  
C
Q
    x(Q;N)

(33)
as a function which is decreasing in consumption, increasing in the number of varieties
and related in an ambiguous way with the aggregate quality level.12However, if the quality
level is high, the innovation rate will tend to be negatively related with Q. As function
I(Q;N;C) may be negative, the relevant innovation rate at the macroeconomic level is
I+(Q;N;C) = maxfI(Q;N;C);0g: (34)
Again, we emphasise the complementarity between horizontal and vertical innovation,
here made clear by the fact that, if N is too low, vertical R&D shuts down.13From (15),
we get the rate of return of capital as r(Q;N;C) = r0   I+(Q;N;C), where r0  0=.
2.5. The dynamic general equilibrium
The dynamic general equilibrium is deﬁned by the allocation fX(!;t);! 2 [0;N(t)];t  0g,
by the prices fp(!;t);! 2 [0;N(t)];t  0g and by the aggregate paths fC(t);N(t);Q(t);I(t);r(t);t  0g,
such that: (i) consumers, ﬁnal-good ﬁrms and intermediate-good ﬁrms solve their prob-
lems; (ii) vertical, horizontal and consistency free-entry conditions are met; and (iii)




  (r0   )  C if I(Q;N;C)  0
1




x(Q;N)  Q if I(Q;N;C)  0
(I(Q;N;C)   + x(Q;N))  Q if I(Q;N;C) > 0
(35b)
_ N = x(Q;N)  N (35c)
given Q(0) and N(0), and the transversality condition (30), which may be re-written as
lim
t!1
e tC(t)   L  Q(t) = 0: (36)
12The partial derivative with Q has the sign of C(t)=Q(t)   =, meaning that it may change over t.
13This contrasts with, e.g., Peretto (2007) and Peretto and Connolly (2007). In these models, vertical
R&D falls to zero when the number of varieties becomes too high, a result that basically reﬂects the
assumption that horizontal R&D competes away scarce resources from vertical R&D.
133. Equilibrium dynamics
3.1. The balanced-growth path
Let gy  _ y=y represent the growth rate of variable y(t). As the functions in system
(35a)-(35c) are homogeneous, a BGP may exist if the further necessary conditions are
veriﬁed (see Appendix B): (i) the growth rates of consumption and of the quality index
are equal, gC = gQ = g; (ii) the vertical-innovation rate is trendless gI = 0; and (iii) the
growth rates of the quality index and the number of varieties are monotonously related,
gQ = ( +  + 1)  gN. Observe that x = gN is always positive if N > 0.
Proposition 1. Assume that   (r0   )= > 0 and that   1. Then there is a BGP
only if the long-run level of the vertical-innovation rate is positive,
I =
( + )
( +  + 1) + 1
 ( + )
> 0; (37)
and where the endogenous growth rates are also positive
g =
( +  + 1)
( +  + 1) + 1





( +  + 1) + 1
 ( + )
> 0: (39)
We should emphasise the result that a BGP will only exist if I > 0 and there is no BGP
in which I = 0. It is convenient to recast system (35a)-(35c), by using variable x as in










 x2 if I(x;z)  0
h


















 I(x;z)   x

 z if I(x;z) > 0
(40b)
Proposition 2. Let HY  HX > 

1  (r0   )=(1 + ). Then there is a unique BGP,
such that I(x;z) > 0, C(t) = zQ(t), Q(t) = =(L)(x)N(0)++1egt,
N(t) = N(0)  eg
Nt, where
x = g










( +  + 1) + 1





no entry and that g > 0 requires r    > 0. This
condition also guarantees g
N > 0. Thus, under a suﬃciently productive technology, our
14model predicts a BGP with constant positive g and gN, where the former exceeds the
latter by an amount corresponding to the growth of intermediate-good quality, driven
by vertical innovation; to verify this, just replace (24) in (26) and solve to get _ q=q =
_ Q=Q   _ N=N = I  , which is positive if I > 0. This implies that the consumption
growth rate equals the growth rate of the number of varieties plus the growth rate
of intermediate-good quality, which is consistent with the idea that industrial growth
proceeds both along an intensive and an extensive margin. A similar result can be found
in, e.g., Arnold (1998), Peretto (1998) and Howitt (1999).
But diﬀerently from the knowledge-driven literature, g
N is not a function of the (exoge-
nous) population growth rate. The negative externality eﬀect in (18) per se determines
a constant N along the BGP (provided population growth is zero; see Barro and Sala-
i-Martin, 2004, ch. 6);14however, the variety expansion is sustained by technological-
knowledge accumulation (independently of population growth), as the expected growth
of intermediate-good quality due to vertical R&D makes it attractive, in terms of in-
tertemporal proﬁts, for potential entrants to always put up an (horizontal) entry cost, in
spite of its increase with N. Hence, vertical R&D is the ultimate growth engine. In this
sense, it is not necessarily the larger economy, measured by population size, that pro-
duces the greater number of varieties, but that with the larger technological-knowledge
stock, which thus emerges as the relevant endogenous economic size measure.
Arnold (1998) and Funke and Strulik (2000) also obtain a positive g
N that is solely
driven by knowledge accumulation. However, this occurs in the form of human-capital
production, with the latter counterbalancing the increasing entry cost due to rising real
wages caused by the positive impact of a growing N in labour marginal productivity.
Evans, Honkapohja, and Romer (1998) build an expanding-variety mechanism with a
lab-equipment speciﬁcation exhibiting dynamic decreasing returns to scale, which is anal-
ogous to the one assumed here. In their model, the expansion of varieties is ultimately
sustained by physical-capital accumulation. The monotonic positive relationship between
g and g
N is qualitatively similar to the one observed in the models cited above.
We interpret the technological-knowledge stock per ﬁrm,  q, as a measure of average
ﬁrm size (or 1=N as ﬁrm size relative to market size). Because _ q=q = I  , it expands
at the growth rate of intermediate-good quality along the BGP. Alternative measures of
ﬁrm size such as production (or sales) per ﬁrm, X=N = HXQ=N (see (9)), or ﬁnancial
assets per ﬁrm, a=N =  = LQ=N (see (23)) produce the same result. Peretto (1998)
takes employment per ﬁrm as an explicit measure of ﬁrm size, while physical capital per
ﬁrm in eﬃciency units and human capital per ﬁrm can be interpreted as measures of
ﬁrm size in Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch. 12), and Arnold (1998) and Funke and Strulik
(2000), respectively.
These results are broadly supported by historical empirical evidence. The increase in
sales per ﬁrm over time is referred to, e.g., by Jovanovic (1993) for the US, while Ehrlich
(1985) ﬁnds a “relative stability of establishment sizes”, measured as employment per
14In fact, the dependence of  on N is necessary to eschew the explosive growth that would occur if 
were constant over t, or depended solely on _ N, thus implying that a BGP would not exist. This is
not the case in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004)’s basic model of pure expanding variety. It can be
shown that the speciﬁcation   (Q), 
0 > 0, 
00 < 0, produces a similar result in our model.
15establishment, in a long time-series data base for the US, Japan and eight European
countries. The increase in the number of ﬁrms and establishments over the long run is
reported, e.g., by Maddison (1994). The last two empirical regularities are conﬁrmed by
Laincz and Peretto (2006), who analyse more recent data for the US.15
On the relationship between economic size and number of ﬁrms, Sherer and Ross
(1990) state the robustness of the cross-sectional evidence that shows that large coun-
tries (measured by population size) tend to have a larger number of ﬁrms (and lower
concentration rates); however, the relationship is far less clear when the comparison
stands between intermediate and large-size countries. An explanation for this result may
be that population size is not the best measure of economic size. Our model suggests
that one should focus instead on endogenous measures of economic size, such as the
technological-knowledge stock.
3.2. Aggregate transitional dynamics
Proposition 3. Under the previous assumptions, the BGP is determinate and is saddle-
point stable. There is a piecewise-smooth continuous stable manifold which is
positively sloped, implying there is a positive correlation between x and z along







(a) If x(0) > ~ x, then there is a point z(0) so that the pair (x;z) diminishes until
the economy crosses the point (~ x; ~ z) at t0. In t 2 [0;t0], we have I(t) = 0;
from t0 onwards, I(t) increases and the pair (x;z) will still diminish until it
reaches the BGP levels (x;z).
(b) If x < x(0) < ~ x, we have 0 < I(0) < I and I(t) increases, while the pair
(x;z) diminishes until it reaches the BGP levels.
(c) If 0 < x(0) < x, then I(0) > I > 0 and I(t) decreases, while the pair (x;z)
increases until it reaches the BGP levels.
[Figure 1 goes about here]
15See Gil (2009) for a detailed discussion of the empirical literature relating ﬁrm dynamics with long-run
economic growth.
16 
Figure 1: Phase diagram in the detrended variables (x;z) for the piecewise-smooth sys-
tem (40a)-(40b). Curves _ x = 0 and _ z = 0 are the isoclines and curve Ws is the
stable manifold, which is the only equilibrium trajectory.
We focus on the empirically relevant case of  > 1 and consider deviations of x above its
steady-state value, i.e., x(0) > x. This would be the case of an economy with a N too low
relative to Q and, thus, ﬁrm size too large: e.g., an emergent-market economy, displaying
a shallow market of diﬀerentiated goods, in contrast to a mature-market economy, which
is expected to boast a deep market of diﬀerentiated goods.16
Proposition 4. Consider an economy initially endowed with N(0), such thatx < x(0) <
~ x, and  > 1. The transitional dynamics is characterised as follows. The economy
experiences a decreasing z and x(= gN); this implies that more resources become
available to Rv, boosting I and reducing r; consequently, g falls due to the down-
ward movement of gN but less so due to the eﬀect of accelerated vertical innovation,
reﬂecting the increase in I. In stationarised terms, both N and Q grow along the
transition path,17 but the former grows more than the latter, implying a falling
ﬁrm size; also, C grows less than Q, whereas E decreases.
16We use the following set of baseline parameter values to illustrate the transitional dynamics:  = 1:2,
 = 1:2,  = 1,  = 0:9,  = 2:5,  = 0:02,  = 1:5,  = 0:4, A = 1, L = 1. Given that along the
BGP, gQ   gN = ( + )gN, the choice of values for  and  is such that ( + ) = 2:4, which is the
ratio between the growth rate of the average ﬁrm size and the growth rate of the number of ﬁrms
we have found in the empirical data (the data, which is available from the authors upon request,
concerns 23 European countries in the period 1995-2005 and was taken from the Eurostat on-line
database). The values for , ,  and  were set in line with previous work on growth and guided
either by empirical ﬁndings or by theoretical speciﬁcation, while the normalisation of A and L to
unity at every t implies that all aggregate magnitudes can be interpreted as per capita magnitudes.
The values of the remaining parameters were chosen in order to calibrate the BGP aggregate growth
rate around 2:5 percent/year.
17In order to compute stationarised Q, Qstat, let Q(t) = Q0e
gQ(t)t (with Q0 > 0) and Qstat(t) =
Q(t)e
 gt; hence, Qstat(t) = Q0e
(gQ(t) g)t. Stationarised N, C and E are computed from Qstat,
after numerical integration.
17According to Proposition 4, our model exhibits the standard conditional convergence
property (falling g and r towards the interior BGP), although through a speciﬁc mecha-
nism. This consists of dynamic second-order eﬀects in horizontal entry (see (18)), imply-
ing that new varieties are brought to the market gradually, as explained earlier. Since
the aggregate production function exhibits constant returns in the accumulated factor,
Q, this friction in horizontal entry is the only source of transitional dynamics. Its mech-
anism operates through imbalances between Q and N, i.e., adjustments in average ﬁrm
size. An economy with very few varieties relative to the technological-knowledge stock
(i.e., with very high ﬁrm size) starts with a smaller I, a higher gN, a higher g and a
higher r than a mature market economy. A lower I implies a higher r (see (15)) and a
lower Rv (see (12)), which secure the larger resources allocated to Rn. Note also that
the higher g is solely justiﬁed by the higher gN. Along the transition path, g and gN
decrease, whereas part of the resources allocated to Rn is gradually re-targeted to Rv.
The consequent increase in I implies a falling r.
Thus, g and I are unequivocally negatively related in transitional dynamics. Due
to the described inter-R&D composition eﬀect, R&D intensity, Rv+Rn
Y  X ,moves in tandem
with I. Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998) report a similar re-balancing eﬀect between
vertical and horizontal R&D; however, their vertical-innovation rate falls in parallel with
aggregate growth and the real interest rate along the transition path (as in Peretto,
1998). On the contrary, the medium-run negative relationship between aggregate growth
and the vertical-innovation rate is also apparent in Aghion and Howitt (1998), but only
for a speciﬁc set of parameter values.18
The latter results oﬀer a theoretical explanation for the lack of positive correlation
between innovation intensity (measured as R&D intensity) and economic growth found
recently (e.g., OECD, 2006), particularly in countries situated below the technological
frontier. In the context of our model, these would be countries approaching the BGP
from above, and exhibiting a low speed of transition.19
Along the transition path. Q=N and g are positively related (see Figure 2). In Aghion
and Howitt (1998), ﬁrm size, measured as the physical-capital stock per ﬁrm in eﬃciency
units, is commanded by the physical-capital stock along the transition path. As long as
the model exhibits the convergence property, it produces a positive relationship between
ﬁrm size and aggregate growth. The models by Peretto (1998), Arnold (1998) and Funke
and Strulik (2000) also generate a positive relationship along the transition path between
aggregate growth and ﬁrm size, measured as employment per ﬁrm in the former and
the human-capital stock per ﬁrm in the other two. Our results then imply that R&D
intensity and ﬁrm size display a negative relationship along the transition path, although
18The mechanism in Aghion and Howitt (1998) is diﬀerent from ours. They develop a quality-ladders
model with physical capital as an input to R&D. Innovation, and hence aggregate growth, is stim-
ulated by a rise in capital intensity towards its BGP level, whilst diminishing marginal returns to
physical capital imply per se a fall in the aggregate-growth rate. For some parameter values, economic
growth and the innovation rate move in opposite directions along the transition path.
19Available empirical evidence suggests slow transitions are the case in general. With a standard set
of baseline parameters (see fn. 16), our model predicts a speed of convergence to the BGP of 2.2
percent/year, implying a half-life of roughly thirty-two years. This is within the range of estimates
given by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, ch. 11) for the US, Japan and several European countries.
18their correlation may be either positive or negative with respect to shifts in the BGP, as
explained below (see Section 4).
Empirical evidence of a positive correlation between aggregate growth and ﬁrm size
(employment per ﬁrm) in the medium-run is provided by Jovanovic (1993) and Laincz
and Peretto (2006), whilst Campbell (1998) reports evidence on the positive correlation
between aggregate growth and the rate of entry (corresponding, in our model, to gN).
With respect to the latter relationship, it is noteworthy that the value of less than one
predicted by our model is clearly matched by the empirical ﬁndings in Campbell (1998).
[Figure 2 goes about here]
Figure 2: Transitional dynamics of N, Q and average ﬁrm size in stationarised terms,
when x(0) > x.
4. Comparative-statics analysis












E(t) = x  N(t) (43)
Diﬀerentiate (38), (39), (42) and (43) with respect to the relevant structural parameters.
The following proposition summarises the main results.
Proposition 5.
(a) The aggregate growth rate, g, and the growth rate of the number of varieties, g
N,
are: (i) decreasing in the ﬁxed cost of vertical R&D, , and in the elasticities of
the horizontal entry cost function,  and ; (ii) increasing in the size of quality
upgrade, ; (iii) independent of the ﬁxed cost of horizontal entry, .
19(b) For a given Q, the number of ﬁrms in the diﬀerentiated-good sector, N, (alterna-
tively, ﬁrm size as measured by Q=N) is decreasing (increasing) in ,  and ,
and is increasing (decreasing) in  and .20 Instantaneous entry, E, for a given
Q, is decreasing in ,  and , and is increasing in  and .
The results in part (a) pertain to the growth eﬀects and part (b) to the level eﬀects
of changes in the structural parameters. The lack of relationship between g and 
is noteworthy. Intuitively, it results from the dominant eﬀect exerted by the vertical-
innovation mechanism (the intensive margin) over the horizontal-entry dynamics (the
extensive margin). Given the postulated horizontal entry technology, an equilibrium BGP
with positive net entry occurs ultimately because entrants expect incumbency value to
grow propelled by quality-enhancing R&D. However,  inﬂuences N and E, reducing
both - and thus increasing ﬁrm size - for a given value of Q, due to its impact on
(23). Arnold (1998) and Funke and Strulik (2000) obtain a similar result with respect
to both the aggregate growth rate and ﬁrm size, while Peretto (1998) predicts a similar
relationship with ﬁrm size but the author establishes a positive relationship with the
aggregate growth rate.
Changes in  and in  have a negative impact on g, but their eﬀects contrast when
it comes to the impact on N and E. Parameter  exerts a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on N and
E, qualitatively similar to the impact due to changes in , whereas  exerts a second-
order eﬀect. These results suggest that industry policies aimed at reducing the variable
costs faced by entrants may have opposing outcomes with respect to their impact on the
market structure and industry dynamics, depending on whether they target  or .
For a given Q, the correlation between N and g
N tends to be negative. This conforms
with some of the empirical evidence on the rate of entry and the number of ﬁrms reported,
e.g., by Sherer and Ross (1990). Since the same relationship applies to g, our model
also predicts that economies with higher long-run growth rates tend to have a market
structure characterised by larger ﬁrms, in line with Peretto (1998) and Aghion and Howitt
(1998).21 A positive empirical relation between ﬁrm size (employment per ﬁrm) and the
aggregate growth rate is found by Pagano and Schivardi (2003).
Our model oﬀers mixed results with respect to the correlation between the vertical-
innovation rate, I (see (37)), and both g and ﬁrm size. Shifts in the BGP due to
changes in the size of quality upgrade, , or in the elasticities of the entry cost function,
 and , yield a negative relationship between the two variables, whilst changes in the
preferences parameters or in  give rise to a positive correlation. The same results apply




Y  X.The impact of
changes in  and  (respectively, ) is explained by an endogenous inter-R&D composition









comparative static results from those in the text. For example,
a




N are both decreasing in that parameter.
21A positive correlation between ﬁrm size and growth is the general case in our model. However, that
correlation is negative when a shift in the BGP is due to a variation in . Likewise, in Aghion
and Howitt (1998), a change in the exogenous labour growth rate (implying a change in the rate of
creation of diﬀerentiated goods, an eﬀect qualitatively similar to a change in  in our model) also
implies a negative relationship between these two variables.
20eﬀect: an increase in these two parameters (decrease) induces a shift of resources from
horizontal R&D to vertical R&D, but the eﬀect on g of the increment in the vertical type
is dominated by the decrease in the horizontal one. In the end, the observed negative
correlation between g and R&D intensity reﬂects the negative correlation between g and
R
v, whose eﬀect outweights the positive relation between g and R
n. A similar reasoning
would apply to the relation between ﬁrm size and R&D intensity. Also in Peretto (1998),
Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998) and others, a change in horizontal entry costs induces
a change of the vertical-innovation rate in the same direction. However, this implies
a positive correlation with aggregate growth, because the latter changes due solely to
the intensive margin (the extensive margin is linked to the exogenous population growth
rate).
According to, e.g., Bassanini, Scarpetta, and Visco (2000), empirical studies in general
ﬁnd a strong positive relationship between R&D intensity and growth at the sectoral
and ﬁrm level, but a clear link is usually diﬃcult to establish at the aggregate (cross-
country) level. On the other hand, Pagano and Schivardi (2003) note that empirical
ﬁrm-level studies on the relationship between ﬁrm size and innovation have failed to
reach a clear conclusion. Nevertheless, those authors conduct a cross-section study at
the aggregate level and ﬁnd that average ﬁrm size matters for growth through its eﬀects
on R&D intensity, thus implicitly establishing a positive correlation between ﬁrm size
and innovation intensity. The literature often places the emphasis on the complexity
of the link between these variables (Audretsch and Keilbacha, 2008), and the several
conceptual and measurement problems that still aﬄict empirical analysis in this ﬁeld
(Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta, 2005) to explain the lack of robust results.
By producing mixed results in this respect, connected to the existence of an endogenous
inter-R&D composition eﬀect, our model lends theoretical support to the lack of clear-
cut empirical ﬁndings. In other words, it shows that the shift of resources between
vertical and horizontal R&D may hide the underlying positive relationship between R&D
intensity and growth.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a non-scale tournament endogenous-growth model, where the
expanding variety and the quality-ladders mechanism are merged under a lab-equipment
speciﬁcation. This assumption implies that the choice between vertical and horizon-
tal innovation is related to the splitting of R&D expenditures, which are fully endoge-
nous. Therefore, we endogenise the overall growth rate and thus the rate of extensive
growth. Our framework gives rise to strong endogenous inter-R&D composition eﬀects
and makes economic growth and ﬁrm dynamics closely related: vertical R&D is the ul-
timate growth engine, whilst horizontal R&D builds an explicit link between aggregate
and ﬁrm-dynamics variables.
The model predicts, under a suﬃciently productive technology, a stationary BGP
with constant positive growth rates, and where the consumption growth rate equals the
growth rate of the number of varieties plus the growth rate of intermediate-good quality,
21in line with the general view that industrial growth proceeds both along an intensive
and an extensive margin. The growth of the number of varieties is sustained by (endoge-
nous) technological-knowledge accumulation, as the expected growth of intermediate-
good quality makes it attractive for potential entrants to always put up an entry cost,
in spite of its upward trend. In this setting, it is not necessarily the larger economies,
measured by population size, that produce the greater number of distinct goods. Instead,
the relevant distinction herein is based on an endogenous measure of economic size, such
as the technological-knowledge stock.
We obtain speciﬁc results with respect to the impact of changes in the entry-cost
parameters both in the aggregate growth rate and in the market structure along the
BGP. We highlight (i) the lack of relationship between economic growth and the ﬁxed
horizontal entry cost, but the positive relation between the latter and ﬁrm size, (ii) the
contrasting eﬀect of changes in the two elasticity parameters of the entry cost function in
ﬁrm size, (iii) the positive correlation between ﬁrm size and economic growth, and (iv)
the mixed result with respect to the BGP relation between R&D intensity and both the
aggregate growth rate and ﬁrm size.
We also conclude that the model exhibits the standard convergence property, though
based on a rather distinct mechanism. The model produces results that diﬀer from
(or expand the results of) the early models of quality ladders with expanding variety. In
particular, we obtain as a general result that medium-term economic growth and ﬁrm size
are positively correlated, whereas R&D intensity and both medium-term economic growth
and ﬁrm size move in opposite directions. The former result adds to the theoretical
predictions already found in the literature, of positive correlation between economic
growth and ﬁrm size measured either as employment per ﬁrm, human-capital stock per
ﬁrm or physical-capital stock per ﬁrm in eﬃciency units, and which have had wide
empirical support. Importantly, the latter result - together with (iv), above - oﬀers a
theoretical explanation for the insigniﬁcant or negative empirical correlation between
aggregate R&D intensity and both economic growth and ﬁrm size, a well-known puzzle
in the growth literature.
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A. Derivation of equation (31)
The aggregate ﬁnancial wealth held by all households is La(t) =
R N(t)
0 V (!;t)d!. If we
consider the arbitrage condition between vertical and horizontal entry, we get
L  a(t) = (t)  N(t) (44)
Hence, we can characterise the change in the value of equity as
L  _ a(t) = (t)  _ N(t) + _ (t)  N(t) (45)
Solve (22) in order to _  and, together with (44) and (28), substitute in (45) to get
r(t)  L  a(t) + L  w(t)   L  C(t) = (t)  _ N(t)      N(t)+
+(r(t) + I(t))  (t)  N(t) +
_  (t)
 (t)
 (t)  N(t) = 0 ,
, (L  w(t) +  (t)  N(t)) LC(t) (t) _ N(t) 

I(t)  (t)  N(t) +
_  (t)
 (t)
 (t)  N(t)

= 0 ,
, Y (t) X(t) LC(t) (t) _ N(t) 

I(t)  (t)  N(t) +
_  (t)
 (t)
 (t)  N(t)

= 0 (46)
where we used Y = wL+pX , Y  X = wL+  N.22 Next, recall that Rn =  _ N
and Rv = I    N + _ 
    N,23 such that (46) reads
Y (t) = X(t) + L  C(t) + Rn(t) + Rv(t)
which is (31).
22Having in mind (1), (3), (8), (9) and (10), and that, in equilibrium, w and p are equated to the
marginal product of labour and the marginal product of intermediate goods, respectively, it is easily
shown that wL = (1 )Y , X = 
2Y , pX = Y and total proﬁts  = X(p 1) = Y  
2Y .
Also, have in mind that given (10) and (19), total proﬁts can be represented as  =    N.
23To see this, recall that
_ 















for _ j = 1 and small , and
use it together with the consistency condition (23), solved in order to N, in (16), to get Rv =
I    L  

1   Q = I    N +
_ 
    N.
25B. Necessary conditions for the existence of a BGP
First, we prove (i) and (ii). Substituting Rv(t) = I(t)    L  

1   Q(t), (8), (9) and
(17) in (31), and simplifying the resultant considering (23) and the fact that, along the
BGP, _ N = gNN, we have












1 . Time-diﬀerentiating (47) and solving in

































Along the BGP, gI, gQ and gC must be constant. Consider three scenarios:
(a) Suppose gI;gQ;gC 6= 0 and gI 6= gQ 6= gC. From (48), this implies that gI changes
as I and C
Q change over time, which is a contradiction.















, gI = 0
which is a contradiction.










This implies that gC changes as
Q
C changes over time, which is also a contradiction.
Then, it must be true that, along the BGP, gQ = gC = g and gI = 0. 


















Since gN must be constant along the BGP, then, by time-diﬀerentiating the equation

















= ( +  + 1)
provided x 6= 0. 
26C. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Using the Caballé and Santos (1993) decomposition, we write C(t) = c(t)egCt,
Q(t) = ~ q(t)egQt and N(t) = n(t)egNt. We can build a detrended system in (c; ~ q;n) only
if gC = gQ = g and gQ = gN(+ +1). If those conditions hold, then x(~ q;n) = x(Q;N)
and I+(C;Q;N) = I+(c; ~ q;n), and an equivalent system for the detrended variables is
obtained: _ n = (x(~ q;n)   gN)  n, _ c = (   I(c; ~ q;n)     g)  (c=), _ ~ q = (I(c; ~ q;n) 
 + x(~ q;n)   gQ)  ~ q. Now, consider the steady state of this system (c; ~ q;n). Firstly,
observe that if we have Hy   Hx   c=~ q   n=~ q < 0, then I = I  = 0. In this case,
there is no BGP because we should have gQ = gN = 0, which contradicts the fact that
gN = x(~ q;n) > 0 if ~ q > 0 and n > 0. Secondly, consider Hy   Hx   c=~ q   n=~ q > 0.
In this case, we get a steady state for I = I+ = I, as in (37), which is positive if  > 0.
Then, there is a unique BGP, C(t) = cegt, Q(t) = ~ qegt, N(t) = neg
Nt, in which
the long run growth rates g and g
N, as in (38) and (39), are positive if  > 0. At last,
the transversality condition limt!1 L(c) ~ q(t)e (+( 1)g)t = 0 holds if   1. 
D. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Consider the change in variables, z = C=Q and x = =(L)Q1=N (++1), and
the equivalent system (40a)-(40b) in detrended variables and Proposition 1. If the BGP is
unique in the initial system (35a)-(35c), it is also unique in this new system. We can also
prove that, in this new system, an admissible steady state (x;z) 2 R2
++, can also exist
if I = I+(x;z) > 0. However, those steady-state level variables should be positive.
Suﬃcient conditions for this are that  > 0 and that the isocline _ z = 0 crosses the axis
z, for x = 0, at non-negative values, that is Hy   Hx > =(1 )(r0   )=(1 + ). At
last, as is usual in endogenous growth models, if we consider the three original variables,
C, Q, and N, the dynamic system in under-determinate. As a natural choice for a
determinate variable is the number of varieties, we can determine explicit values along
the BGP by choosing N(0) as given. Therefore, the economy will be placed along a BGP
if Q(0) = (=)(x)N(0)++1. 
E. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Consider the system (40a)-(40b) and its admissible steady state (x;z), where












(1 + )z=() (1   )x=
 z=()   [( +  + 1) +  + ]x=

As det(J(x;z)) =  [( +  + 1) +  + ]=(

(1 )) < 0, then J(x;z) has one
negative, s < 0, and one positive eigenvalue. The slope of the eigenspace associated to
the negative eigenvalue is  (a22x s)=(a21z). As a21 < 0 then the slope has the same
27sign as a22x   s. After some algebra, we get
















































Then a22x   s > 0 if   1 and the local stable manifold is positively sloped in the
neighbourhood of (x;z).
The phase diagram in Figure 1 allows for a geometric characterisation of the dynamics
of transition. Observe that curve I+(x;z) = 0, that we will call switching curve, divides
the state space into two zones: in the northeast area, where, as I+(x;z) < 0, we set
I = 0 and the dynamics is given by the ﬁrst branch, and in the southwest area, where
we have I+(x;z) > 0 and the dynamics is given by the second branch. The isocline
_ x = 0 is negatively sloped and lies entirely in the second branch. The isocline _ z = 0
passes through the two branches: it has a positive intercept in the second branch if
Hy  Hx > =(1 )(r0  )=(1+), has a positive slope and cuts the switching curve
at point x = , where it is continuous but piecewise-smooth, and is vertical in the ﬁrst
branch. As x is a predetermined variable, this means that if x(0) <  then the transition
path lies entirely in the second branch, and approaches the BGP values (x;z) as shown
in the ﬁgure because the slope of the stable manifold is ﬂatter than the isocline _ z = 0.



















If x(0) > ~ x, the transition path is a concatenation of a transition path lying in the
ﬁrst branch with the transition path in the second branch. This can be proved if we
observe that: ﬁrst, the paths in the ﬁrst branch to the right of the isocline _ z = 0 cross
the switching curve in a point ~ x >  but smaller than
(++1)++
(++1)+ 1
 (+), which is the
projection of the steady state z into the switching curve, because of the slope of the
stable manifold; second, the paths starting in the ﬁrst branch to the right of the isocline
_ z = 0 approach the switching curve and cross it. We can prove that there is no other





















x2 + (x   )z
 
> 0
because the collision should take place for x > . This means that the path coming
from the ﬁrst branch approaches the switching curve with the same direction as the one
28deﬁned by the vector ﬁeld for I+ < 0, that is, both x and z decrease, which means that it
will cross the switching boundary and continue with the same direction inside the second
branch. We cannot determine the crossing point exactly, but we know that it should
be in the intersection of the stable manifold in the second branch with the switching
boundary. This means that the stable manifold is piecewise-smooth and lies in the two
branches as depicted in Figure 1. 
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￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿& ’ ( ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿7 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿< ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿8 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿& ’ ( ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿9 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4￿ ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
"￿￿￿￿￿ ￿7 ￿￿"￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿& ’ ( ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿: ￿
" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿6 ￿￿ ￿
￿9 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿3 4 & ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ? ( ￿ $. ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ : ￿1 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ? ( ￿ $. ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿! ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿, ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ "￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ? ( ￿ $. ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿; ￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿# ￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
6 ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ $￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿; ￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿= > ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ( A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ > ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ? ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿3 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿0 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ? ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿ /￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿) ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿, ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿"￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿
) ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿5 ￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 7 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ $￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿"￿￿7 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 9 ￿
" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿< ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿9 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿
& ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿ : ￿
￿ ￿ $￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿< ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿A￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿# ￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4￿ ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ! ￿
￿￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿3 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿"￿￿7 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
< ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 5 ￿ $? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿8 ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ 7 ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿   ￿
" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ $￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿/ ￿￿5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿"￿￿7 ￿￿ ￿( ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ $￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿8 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿  /￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿3 4 & ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ’ 5 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿  7 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿3 4 & ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿7 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ’ 5 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿  9 ￿
￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿* ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿- ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿( ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ’ 5 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿  : ￿
B ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ $￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿# ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿. ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿8 ￿B C D C ￿
E F F G ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ’ 5 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿  ￿￿
￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿5 ￿￿"￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿8 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿* ￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ’ 5 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿  ! ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿) ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ’ 5 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿  ￿￿
B ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ $￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿8 ￿B C D D ￿
E F F G ￿￿￿* ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿  ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ C ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 5 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿9 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
* ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿    ￿
￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿/ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
* ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4￿ ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿ /￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿"￿￿￿￿6 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿7 ￿￿￿3 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿, ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿"￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿@ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 7 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿, ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
2 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿
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￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿